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AMICI’S STATEMENT OF INTEREST
Those who seek to appear as amici curiae (listed on page i) share the
mission of protecting consumers’ rights and ensuring that only lawful means are
used to collect legitimate debts. Nearly all Amici provide direct legal services to
low-income or financially distressed consumers in debt collection cases. All Amici
participate in legislative, educational or other advocacy efforts to protect
consumers’ rights. Clients of Amici include the disabled, the elderly, low-wage
workers, and other New Yorkers whom Local Law 15 was enacted to benefit.
Counsel for all parties consent to the filing of this brief. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court’s decision to invalidate Local Law 15, New York City's
debt collection statute, as it applies to debt collection attorneys, was improper as a
matter of law and public policy for many reasons. The court ignored the ample
evidence demonstrating that attorneys engaged in debt collection -- and those who
lend their names to debt collection mills disguised as law offices -- conduct the
identical non-legal activities as non-attorney debt collectors, while wielding the
power of their law licenses. The court erred in finding that state law preempts
Local Law 15, and that Local Law 15 presents ethical dilemmas for debt collection
1

No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part and no party or party’s counsel or
person contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.
1

attorneys. The District Court also failed to abstain from analyzing the unsettled
question of whether a municipality may regulate attorneys doing non-legal work.
Furthermore, the District Court overlooked the public policy behind Local Law 15
and the law’s positive benefit to consumers. Finally, despite clear evidence to the
contrary, the court determined that existing disciplinary rules suffice to regulate
attorneys. Thus, the court has left a gaping hole in New York City’s regulatory
scheme, which will now engender affirmative litigation by consumers seeking to
vindicate the rights the City Council intended to champion.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Explosion of Debt-Buyer Industry
The third-party debt collection industry has undergone radical growth and

transformation in the last two decades, in part due to a burgeoning consumer credit
market, technological innovation, and debt buying. Transcript of the Federal Trade
Commission Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenge of Change at 9-11 (Oct.
10, 2007).2 Advanced information and credit risk technology have enabled
creditors to dramatically expand their customer base, while debt collection firms
use “sophisticated analytics” to target debtors most likely to pay, relying on
“automated dialers, predictive dialing algorithms, and internal telephony” to lower
cost and enhance their reach. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Fair

2

Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report, at 9 (Mar. 20, 2013) (“CFPB
Annual Report 2013”).
Third-party debt collection is a “growth industry.” Robert M. Hunt,
Collecting Consumer Debt in America, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Business Review, Second Quarter, at 11, 13 (2007). Between 1982 and 2002,
while total household consumer debt adjusted for inflation doubled, collection
industry revenues more than tripled and employment in the industry more than
doubled. Id.
The NYC metropolitan area has the fourth highest employment level for
debt collectors in the nation. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Occupational Employment Statistics: Employment of Bill and Account Collectors
by state (May 2012). As recently as 2010, New York ranked among the top five
states in total debt collected, $5.3 billion, with debt collectors earning $1.13 billion
in commissions. Ernst & Young, The Impact of Third-Party Debt Collection on the
National and State Economies 6-7 (Feb. 2012).
Notably, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has stated that “[t]he most
significant change in the debt collection business in the past decade . . . has been
the advent and growth of debt buying (i.e., the purchasing, collecting, and reselling
of debts in default).” FTC, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of
2

Available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/FTC_DebtCollect_071010.pdf.
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Change; A Workshop Report iv (Feb. 2009). Recently, the FTC released an
illuminating study of the debt buying industry, examining more than 5,000
portfolios containing nearly 90 million consumer accounts. FTC, The Structure
and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry ii (Jan. 2013) (“Debt Buying Industry”).
Of the accounts analyzed, debt buyers paid an average of four cents per dollar of
debt face value. Id. The report concluded that buyers “rarely received dispute
history,” id., rarely received underlying documents about debts such as account
statements or terms and conditions of credit, and purchased the portfolios “as is” –
without warranties as to the accuracy of information provided. Id. at iii.
B.

Increasing Role of Debt Collection Law Firms
The expansion of debt collection and the advent of debt buying have

transformed the collection law firm sector. Today, “collectors more commonly use
litigation as a collection strategy than they did when the FDCPA was enacted” in
1977. CFPB Annual Report 2013 at 9. “Attorneys play an integral role in the debt
collection process[;] [w]hether acting independently as debt collectors, assisting
collection agencies, or working in concert with creditors, attorneys write letters,
pursue collection, and ultimately file suit to collect delinquent debt.” Comments of
ACA International Regarding the Debt Collection Workshop at 45 (June 6, 2007).
Debt collectors themselves acknowledge the “gravity of influence” attorney
involvement can have on consumers. Id.
4

Collection law firms vary in methods of collection. Many law firms simply
send on behalf of, or furnish to, the creditor a dunning letter or series of letters for
a small flat fee or pursuant to a retainer. See, e.g., Miller v. Upton, Cohen &
Slamowitz, 687 F. Supp. 2d 86, 103 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Other collection firms
specialize in filing a high volume of consumer collection suits, of which 53%
resulted in default judgments in NYC Civil Court in 2012. Memorandum Re NYC
Civil Court Consumer Debt Matters 2012 (March 8, 2013 ) (on file with authors);
see also The Legal Aid Society, et al., Debt Deception: How Debt Buyers Abuse
the Legal System to Prey on Lower Income New Yorkers 1-2 (May 2010) (“Debt
Deception”) (finding that five law firms filed roughly two-thirds of the 457,322
debt buyer lawsuits filed between January 2006 through July 2008, and that four
out of five cases initially resulted in default judgments for debt buyers). These law
firms typically retain a portion, e.g., 15-50%, of any amount collected. R. Hobbs,
National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection at 7 (7th ed. 2011) (“Fair
Debt Collection”).
Many collection law firms employ dozens to hundreds of collectors, but only
a handful of attorneys. In a 2009 deposition of a partner at the New York law firm
of Cohen & Slamowitz, David A. Cohen admitted to employing 14 lawyers, 30 to
40 legal secretaries and paralegals, and 60 debt collectors in his office. Andrew
Martin, Automated Debt-Collection Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. Times, July 13,
5

2010, at B1. The website of another local debt collection law firm, Pressler &
Pressler, boasts “over 300 employees and 18 attorneys.”3 These law firms use their
sizable non-legal staff to engage in non-litigation debt collection activities, even
absent the possibility of a lawsuit. According to the deposition of attorney Michael
Young, who worked at the debt collection law firm James A. West P.C. in Texas,
his firm filed approximately 30 to 40 lawsuits per month on behalf of creditors, and
he personally sent between 500 and 4,000 debt collection letters per day.
Villarreal v. JP Morgan Chase, 10 CV 0053 (S.D. Tx), Deposition Tr. Of Michael
Young (Sept. 15, 2010) at 17-18 (on file with authors). Recently, The Schreiber
Law Firm, PLLC, which has two attorneys, entered into a “strategic alliance” with
AMG Financial Services, LLC that will allow it to “offer all of its collection
services to clients whose account debtors are located nationally,” even though its
two attorneys are licensed to practice law in only five states and the District of
Columbia. InsideArm, AMG Financial Services Expands and Enters Strategic
Alliance with the Schreiber Law Firm, May 20, 2013.
Law firms increasingly are entering into the debt buying industry
themselves. Prohibited from purchasing debt directly, they create separate
companies to purchase and collect debt. Jane Adler, Law Firms Balloon, Cards and
Payments, Apr. 2006, at 48-51. For example, the following law firms in NYC
3

Available at http://presslerjobs.com/.
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have created their own debt-buying LLCs: Mel S. Harris and Associates (Pinpoint
Technologies); Cohen & Slamowitz (Gemini Asset Recoveries and Metro
Portfolios); Eltman Eltman & Cooper (Erin Capital Management); and Mullooly,
Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn (NY Financial Services). Debt Deception at 4.
C.

Debt Collection Complaints
The debt collection industry is rife with abuse and is often unfair to

unsophisticated consumers. In its 2013 Annual Report to Congress, the CFPB
declared that the debt collection industry “remains a top source of consumer
complaints.” CFPB Annual Report 2013 at 9. Notably, third-party debt collection
complaints significantly outnumber in-house, original creditor debt collection
complaints. Id. at 56. In 2012, debt collection complaints accounted for 24.1% of
all consumer complaints to the FTC, of which 19.8% involved third-party debt
collection and a mere 4.3% involved original creditor debt collection. Id.
At the state level, the NYS Consumer Protection Division reported that in
2011 debt collection was the second highest complaint. NYS Assembly Standing
Committee on Consumer Affairs and Protection, Public Hearing on the
Effectiveness of the Consumer Protection Division (CPD) Within the Department
of State (DOS) 19-20 (Nov. 28, 2012). In NYC, the Department of Consumer
Affairs (DCA) reported that, in 2012, debt collection abuses were the top consumer
complaint for the fifth year in a row. Press Release, NYC Dep’t of Consumer
7

Affairs Names Debt Collectors Top Complaint for the Fifth Year in a Row (Mar. 5,
2012).
D.

Government Oversight of Debt Collection

1. Federal Response
In 1977, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., “to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to
promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
practices.” § 1692(e). Congress found that “abundant evidence of the use of
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” §
1692(a). The FDCPA provides for a private right of action and statutory penalties,
§ 1692k, and civil enforcement of the law is now shared by the CFPB and the FTC.
§ 1692l.
Although the FDCPA originally exempted attorneys from coverage,
Congress eliminated this exemption in 1986, having found that it had become a
major loophole in the law. Some law firms had become indistinguishable from
collection agencies, except for their letterhead and immunity from the FDCPA, and
even touted their exemption from the FDCPA to garner additional debt collection
8

business. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-405, at 1 (1985), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1752. Similarly, in promulgating rules subjecting nonbank
financial companies to oversight, the CFPB rejected public comments urging it to
exclude attorneys from the consumer debt collection market. 77 Fed. Reg. 65784-5
(Oct. 31, 2012).
2. State Response
In 1973, before the FDCPA was enacted, New York adopted protections
against abusive debt collection practices. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 601, et seq. The
state law prohibits creditors and their agents from, inter alia, attempting to collect
charges that are not “justly due and legally chargeable.” Id. However, the statute
does not provide for a private right of action and enforcement is limited to the
Attorney General or district attorneys. § 602(2). New York, unlike numerous other
states, does not license debt collectors.
3. NYC Response
In 1968, NYC established the nation’s first municipal consumer protection
agency and has been at the forefront of consumer protection policy and practice for
over 50 years. DCA, 2007 Annual Report (2007) (Overview of DCA). In 1984,
the City Council stated that debt collection agencies used “tactics which would
shock the conscience of ordinary people.” NYC Admin. Code § 20-488 (2013). It
therefore enacted a local law in 1985 to license debt collection agencies and to
9

subject them to DCA’s regulation. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-488, et seq. Thus,
NYC established a mandate for licensing debt collection agencies in order to
“protect the interests, reputations and fiscal well-being of the citizens of this city
against those agencies that would abuse their privilege of operation.” NYC
Admin. Code § 20-488. Substantive protections against abusive debt collection
practices are set out in municipal regulations. Rules of City of N.Y. Pt. 6 (2013).
For example, they require debt collectors to verify a debt when disputed; disclose a
person’s legal rights when the debt is past the statute of limitations; confirm in
writing an agreed-upon debt payment schedule or settlement agreement within five
business days; maintain records for the debts upon which it collects; and provide a
call-back number answered by a natural person. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-489;
Rules of the City of New York § 5-77.
In 2009, the City Council enacted N.Y.C. Local Law No. 15 Int. No. 660-A
(2009) (hereinafter “Local Law 15”) after conducting hearings that revealed how
debt collectors often collect on questionable debts and, in doing so, frequently
abuse Amici’s clients, who are disabled, elderly, poor, and lack knowledge of their
rights. The new law clarified that the licensing requirement of the existing law
applied to entities that purchase and collect delinquent debt, as well as attorneys
and law firms who engage in activities traditionally performed by debt collectors.

10

ARGUMENT
The court below improperly found that Local Law 15, which amended New
York City’s law to clarify that the City’s debt collection licensing law applied to
attorneys engaging in activities traditionally performed by debt collectors,
conflicted with NYS judiciary law. In fact, a municipality may regulate licensed
attorneys in certain circumstances -- as here, where the practice of prelitigation
debt collection is easily differentiated from the practice of law -- without
presenting ethical problems for attorneys. Further, to the extent that the applicable
state law is unsettled, the court should not have exercised supplemental
jurisdiction, and should have instead dismissed the claim. In addition, the court
overlooked the important and well established policy of debt collection laws, and
the need for strong local legislation to protect New Yorkers from exploitive debt
collectors with law licenses. Without the City’s oversight of debt collection
lawyers and law firms, consumers have fewer protections from unfair attempts to
collect questionable debts, no redress through the DCA, and little chance of
obtaining relief through the State’s grievance procedure. The court was wrong to
find that the NYC Council exceeded its authority in passing Local Law 15. The
decision should be reversed.

11

I. LOCAL LAW 15 IS A PERMISSIBLE MUNICIPAL
REGULATION OF LICENSED ATTORNEYS
A. Debt Collecting is Distinct from Practicing Law
Attorneys may be regulated under Local Law 15 because traditional debt
collection is distinct from the practice of law. The court found that it was
“impossible to say” when a debt collection attorney “is acting simply as a debt
collector, and not as an attorney.” Eric M. Berman, P.C. v. City of New York, 895
F.Supp.2d 453, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). In particular, the court found that traditional
debt collection practices of calling consumers and sending dunning letters, for
example, are “core aspects of the practice of law.” 895 F. Supp. at 472. These
conclusions reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of debt collection
and are directly at odds with case law, Congressional findings, and Amici’s
experience. 4 By giving a competitive edge to unscrupulous debt collection
attorneys, the court’s decision opens the door to the same dangers that drove
Congress, over 25 years ago, to include attorneys in the definition of debt
collectors. Under the decision, attorneys collecting debts are in a unique position
to use their licenses as both shields and swords.
4

In three pages on this subject, Plaintiffs merely pointed out that it is hard for attorneys to
distinguish between being a collector and being an attorney when calling consumers. Pl.’s Reply
Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 18-20. In Amici’s experience, debt collection attorneys rarely if ever
speak directly with consumers pre-litigation; even most out-of-court contacts are by the law
firm’s non-attorney debt collectors.

12

The Second Circuit has found that attorneys act solely as debt collectors, and
not as attorneys or in any legal capacity, when they send letters to consumers
without actually reviewing the letters or consumers’ individual files:
[A]ttorneys can participate in debt collection in any number of ways,
without contravening the FDCPA so long as their status as attorneys is
not misleading. . . . our prior precedents demonstrate that an attorney
can, in fact, send a debt collection letter without being meaningfully
involved as an attorney within the collection process, so long as that
letter includes disclaimers that should make clear even to the “least
sophisticated consumer” that the law firm or attorney sending the
letter is not, at the time of the letter’s transmission, acting as an
attorney.
Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, LLP, 412 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 2005).
Other circuits agree:
We caution lawyers who send debt collection letters to state clearly,
prominently, and conspicuously that although the letter is from a
lawyer, the lawyer is acting solely as a debt collector and not in any
legal capacity when sending the letter. The disclaimer must explain
to even the least sophisticated consumer that lawyers may also be debt
collectors and that the lawyer is operating only as a debt collector at
that time. Debt collectors acting solely as debt collectors must not
send the message that a lawyer is involved, because this deceptively
sends the message that the “price of poker has gone up.”
Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also
Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added) (“[W]e believe that it was misleading and deceptive for the Kay
Law Firm to raise the specter of potential legal action by using its law firm title to
collect a debt when the firm was not acting in its legal capacity when it sent the
13

letters.”). The established distinction between attorneys acting as attorneys and
attorneys acting in a non-legal capacity is not one that the NYC Council created
from whole cloth. The debt collection activity addressed by Local Law 15 does
not require a law license, but exempting individuals who have such a license
creates an obvious loophole for the debt collectors who retain attorneys and
especially for those attorneys who collect on debts they purchase through
subsidiary companies.
Regulatory agencies have not had difficulty in differentiating between
actions taken by debt collection attorneys that are clearly collection-related and
those that are purely legal in nature. FTC investigations of debt collection law
firms show the underside of their businesses and reveal starkly the lack of “legal”
work they conduct. For example, in 2013, the FTC entered into a consent order
with the Jacob Law Group, a debt collection law firm, in an action brought in part
for FDCPA violations. Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent
Injunction, FTC v. Security Credit Servs., 1:13-cv-00799 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19,
2013).5 The sophistication and scope of this firm’s non-litigation activity firm is
evident; it sought to collect on more than 300,000 consumer debt accounts, but
filed only 5,600 lawsuits in five years. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and
Other Equitable Relief at 7, ¶ 18, FTC v. Security Credit Servs., 1:13-cv-00799
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(N.D. Ga. Mar. 13, 2013) . Non-litigation efforts included traditional debt
collection efforts such as “skip-tracing,” issuing collection notices, and contacting
consumers by telephone. Id. at 6, ¶ 17.
In another case, involving New York attorney Salvatore Spinelli and the
debt collection agency Oxford Collection Agency, Inc. (“Oxford”), the FTC
alleged that the law firm conducted a “major portion” of Oxford’s collection
activity. Complaint at 3, ¶ 8, U.S.A. v. Oxford Collection Agency, No. CV-09-2467
(E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009) (“Oxford Complaint”). Defendants engaged in
consumer debt collection nationwide and had three million active accounts. Id. at
5, ¶ 14. The complaint alleged multiple FDCPA violations, including contacting
third parties illegally, id. at 9, ¶ 35; using obscene and profane language, id. at 10,
¶ 37(a); and falsely representing or implying that nonpayment of a debt would
result in arrest or imprisonment. Id. at 10, ¶ 38(a).
The experiences of Amici’s clients further illustrate the demarcation of debt
collection and legal activity and why regulation of such actions is so important. A
client of an Amici organization, Ms. F, began receiving harassing telephone calls
from a non-attorney debt collector at a debt collection law firm while she was at
work as a home health aide. The debt collector ignored her repeated requests to
stop calling during work hours. If the entity that called Ms. F. had no attorneys, it
5

Stipulation available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1123175/130326scsorder.pdf.
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would have to provide detailed verification of the debt, and be prohibited from
calling more than twice in seven days. However, simply by having a law license,
this firm’s employees were exempt from the law that protects consumers like Ms.
F from misconduct entirely distinct from practicing law.
B. Local Law 15 is Not Preempted by Judiciary Law §§ 53 and 90
The court held that Local Law 15’s regulation of attorney conduct conflicts
with and is thus preempted by New York Judiciary Law §§ 53 and 90, which vest
the admission, supervision and regulation of attorneys with the judiciary. Berman,
895 F. Supp. 2d at 469. The court held that attorneys may be regulated by DCA
only when engaging in unquestionably non-legal activities like “driving a taxi cab
or operating a fruit stand.” Berman, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
However, the reach of the judiciary’s power is based not on the status of the
actor, but on whether the conduct constitutes the practice of law. See In re
Zuckerman, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 439 (1967) (holding that pursuant to § 90, attorneys’
“professional conduct is subject to the supervisory and corrective powers” of the
state judiciary) (emphasis added); In re Wong, 275 A.D.2d 1, 5, (1st Dep't 2000)
(holding that § 90 “broadly establishes judicial governance over the conduct of
attorneys”) (emphasis added). Even then, the state judiciary law does not occupy
the entire field of attorney supervision, preempting all other bodies. See Forti v.
N.Y.S. Ethics Comm’n, 75 N.Y.2d 596, 615 (1990) (“Plaintiff[’s] separation of
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powers claim rests on the erroneous assumption that only the judiciary may
regulate the practice of law . . . .”); People v. Law Office of Capoccia, 289 A.D.2d
650, 651 (3d Dep’t 2001); Press Release, NYS Office of the Attorney General,
A.G. Schneiderman Announces $4 Million Settlement With New York Foreclosure
Law Firm Steven J. Baum P.C. And Pillar Processing LLC (Mar. 22, 2012)
(settling claims with Steven J. Baum P.C., a foreclosure law firm, for violating NY
Executive Law and General Business Law by bringing foreclosure proceedings
without taking appropriate steps to verify the accuracy of the allegations and the
plaintiff’s standing to foreclose—conduct that goes to the heart of litigation
activity).
Local Law 15’s conduct-based standard indicates that the City Council was
fully aware of the prevailing standard: it excludes attorneys collecting a debt
“through activities that may only be performed by a licensed attorney,” but not
attorneys “who regularly engage[] in activities traditionally performed by debt
collectors, including, but not limited to, contacting a debtor through the mail or via
telephone with the purpose of collecting a debt.” § 20-489(5).
State courts have permitted similar municipal regulation of attorneys as that
at issue here. In Aponte v. Raychuk, the court enjoined an attorney’s newspaper
advertisements as deceptive and misleading to the consumer public under the NYC
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Consumer Protection Law. 140 Misc. 2d 864 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1988). It
reasoned that:
although the State has a comprehensive scheme to regulate attorneys’
conduct, it does not appear to preempt the City's attempt to protect its
consumers. Rather than being inconsistent with the scheme, the City's law
supplements it, providing additional protection to the consuming public.
Id. at 869. The Appellate Division affirmed, “find[ing] no inconsistency between
the local law and the legislative delegation of authority to this court to regulate the
conduct of attorneys[, n]or [being] able to discern any implied legislative intent to
preempt this area of regulation.” 160 A.D.2d 636 (1st Dep’t 1990).
The court distinguished Aponte because Local Law 15 “directly regulate[s]
core aspects of the practice of law.” Berman, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 472. State
preemption law, however, is not nearly as limiting as the court described. The
local law upheld in Aponte, Consumer Protection Law § 20-700, regulates nearly
identical conduct as found in Local Law 15, and provides that: “[n]o person shall
engage in any deceptive or unconscionable trade practice . . . .” Moreover, Aponte
considered the application of this local law to conduct specifically regulated in
great detail by NY Rule of Professional Conduct 7.1, attorney advertising, which is
far from “the incidental regulations of attorney conduct that have been upheld by
the New York courts.” Id. at 472. Because the conduct in question here—
traditional, prelitigation debt collection—is easily distinguishable from the practice
18

of law, Local Law 15 is not preempted; in fact, by protecting consumers, it is in
keeping with state law pursuant to Aponte.6
C. Local Law 15 Does Not Cause Debt Collection Attorneys to
Violate Ethical Duties to Clients
Local Law 15 does not conflict with the state judiciary’s Rules of
Professional Conduct, as stated by the court. 895 F. Supp. 2d at 472. The court
reasoned that requiring a debt collector to inform a consumer when a debt is timebarred “require[s] attorneys to violate their ethical duties to clients,” 895 F. Supp.
2d at 473, but did not specify which ethical duties. In fact, attorneys would not
violate any ethical duties by informing consumers when a claim is time-barred:
they would simply be acting as agents of their debt collector clients, who must
provide this information.
Furthermore, these duties exist within the bounds of the law. See, e.g., Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168–69, 106 S. Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (“[A]n
attorney's ethical duty to advance the interests of his client is limited by an equally
solemn duty to comply with the law . . . .”). For example, Section 3 of Rule 3.4,
entitled “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel,” prohibits an attorney from

6

Additionally, New York rules of statutory interpretation require liberal construction of statutes
that promote public welfare. N.Y. Stat. Law § 341. The court’s failure to liberally interpret the
law to permit licensure of debt collection attorneys advances their private interests, rather than
the public welfare purpose of consumer protection.
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concealing or failing to disclose “that which the lawyer is required by law to
disclose.” Local Law 15 simply defines one of these contemplated disclosures, in
cases of time-barred debts.
D. The District Court Should Have Abstained from Deciding an
Unsettled Area of Law
In finding Local Law 15 was preempted, the court relied on Matter of Roth
v. Turoff, which found that a local ordinance requiring taxicab brokers to be
licensed was preempted by the Judiciary Law to the extent that it applied to
attorneys. 127 Misc. 2d 998 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1985), aff'd sub nom., 124 A.D.2d
471 (1st Dep't 1986). However, Roth does not govern. First, it precedes Aponte,
and, therefore, its statement that “no local legislature has the power to define new
limitations on the practice of the law,” id. at 1000, has been implicitly overruled.
Second, the ordinance in Roth is distinguishable from Local Law 15 because the
former, involving taxicab brokers, imposed requirements on attorneys that did not
equally apply to their clients, whereas the latter simply closes a loophole by
requiring attorneys who collect debts to conform to the same regulations as their
clients, for whom they are agents.
Although Aponte directly governs, to the extent Aponte and Roth conflict,
rendering applicable state law unsettled, the court should have abstained from
deciding this issue. A court abuses its discretion by exercising supplemental
jurisdiction when a state law claim turns on conflicting state court precedent,
20

Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 308 (2d Cir. 2003), or “a novel and
complex issue involving the interpretation of state statutes concerning the
administration of state government,” Seabrook v. Jacobson, 153 F.3d 70, 71 (2d
Cir. 1998).
“[T]he interplay between the responsibilities imposed by municipal law and
those imposed by state law are fundamental and complex questions involving the
balancing of important policies of state government,” and should be defined by the
state court. Id. Regulation of debt collectors is of particular local concern. See
Silver v. Woolf, 694 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Debt collection practices have long
been viewed as a proper matter for regulation by the states . . . . The perceived
abuses and consequent harm [caused by debt collectors—i.e.,] abusive language
and threats followed by feelings of insult and humiliation and an urge to pay a
disputed debt solely to avoid further harassment—are almost entirely localized.”).
Comity is doubly warranted here because the state court is not only the appropriate
interpreter of state law, but also the body whose authority was found to be
preemptive. Therefore, abstention was most prudent. The court abused its
discretion by deciding this case on unsettled state law.
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II. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS STRONG DEBT COLLECTION
LAWS TO LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD, PROTECT
CONSUMERS, AND PROVIDE THEM NECESSARY REDRESS
A. Local Law 15 and the Accompanying Rules Provide Critical
Consumer Protections
For many of the same reasons the FDCPA was enacted and applies to
attorneys, Local Law 15 and the DCA’s implementing rules provide vital
protections against egregious abuses by debt collectors, including collection
attorneys against NYC consumers.7 Specifically, the Debt Deception study found
that regulation has a positive impact on collectors’ behavior, and that unlicensed
debt buyers “obtained a significantly higher percentage of default judgments than
licensed debt buyers, suggesting that unlicensed debt buyers engaged in more
abusive practices.” Debt Deception at 97. Furthermore, “[a]buses by attorney debt
collectors are more egregious than those of lay collectors because a consumer
reacts with far more duress to an attorney’s improper threat of legal action than to a
debt collection agency committing the same practice.” Crossley v. Lieberman, 868
F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989).

7

Local Law 15 was enacted to “protect the interests, reputations and fiscal well-being of the
citizens of this city . . .”, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-488, and is not, as Plaintiffs argue, “a trap in
which thousands of good-faith attorneys likely will fall, thereby generating windfall revenues for
New York City in the form of fines.” Decl. Mark H. Stein in Supp. Pls.' Mot. Summ. J ¶ 12.
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For example, Amici client Ms. J was hospitalized after an accident.
Unemployed at the time, she should have qualified for Medicaid, but the hospital
failed to submit all of the necessary paperwork. Three years after hospital
discharge, Ms. J received a letter from a debt collection law firm that she had been
sued for almost $60,000, that she had already been served with court papers
(though she had not), and that the firm would move for a default judgment unless
she replied to the letter. When Ms. J called the law firm, a paralegal told her that it
was too late to do anything but pay, even though the firm had not yet sought a
default judgment. Ms. J relied on this misinformation, resulting in a default
judgment against her. Ms. J’s story demonstrates the heightened potential for abuse
of the collection process by unscrupulous attorneys, and the need for regulation.
The requirement that a debt collector verify a disputed debt is a critical
consumer protection, given countless reports of debt collectors attempting to
collect invalid debts – including debts resulting from identity theft, discharged in
bankruptcy, or already paid or settled – or from the wrong person. See Jeff
Horwitz, Bank of America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty Records,
American Banker, Mar. 29, 2012 (reporting that Bank of America sold portfolios
of defaulted debts while warning that some had already been paid or might have
been extinguished in bankruptcy); Jeff Horwitz, OCC Probing JPMorgan Chase
Credit Card Collections, American Banker, Mar. 12, 2012 (reporting that Chase
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sold portfolios of defaulted debts that it considered unreliable, that lacked
documentation, and with incorrect amounts listed as owed). Numerous studies
have documented problems with debt buyers whose business model is to buy old,
defaulted debts for pennies on the dollar and receive little to no documentation or
assurances about the debts they purchase. Debt Buying Industry at ii-iii. In the
collective experience of Amici, NYC debt buyers frequently attempt to collect
debts that resulted from identity theft, were disputed with the original creditor or
settled, or are time-barred. Amici have even seen instances where different debt
buyers pursued the same person for a single debt.
The FDCPA inadequately remedies these abuses because its verification
requirement has been diluted to the point of ineffectiveness, and because
consumers must dispute debts within 30 days of receiving the collector’s initial
written communication to avail themselves of its protection. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.
In contrast, the local law and rules give NYC residents the right to more
meaningful debt verification, which they may exercise at any time. An Amici
client, Ms. B, is permanently disabled due to a congenital heart condition. With a
store credit card, she purchased a bedroom suite, which was never delivered
because the store filed for bankruptcy. The debt was then sold multiple times. In
2011, a debt collection law firm began contacting her about the debt. With help
from a legal services organization, she sent a dispute letter requesting verification
24

under NYC law. Unable to provide the verification, the law firm was required to
stop collection activity against Ms. B.
Local Law 15 and rules also give greater protection against unfair collection
attempts on time-barred debts. As the FTC noted:
Most consumers do not know their legal rights with respect to
collection of [such] debts [. . . ]. When a collector tells a consumer
that she owes money and demands payment, it may create the
misleading impression that the collector can sue the consumer in court
to collect that debt.
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Under FTC Settlement, Debt
Buyer Agrees to Pay $2.5 Million for Alleged Consumer Deception (Jan. 30,
2012). Consumers may also have difficulty determining whether a debt is
time-barred because the statute of limitations on a credit card debt ranges
from three to six years, depending on where the original creditor is based.
Amici have seen numerous instances in which a law firm began harassing
the client for payment of a debt long after any applicable statute of
limitations expired. Often by deceptive statements, the debt buyers then
convinced the clients to make just a “token” $15 or $25 payment, for
example, thereby reviving the statute of limitations. The DCA rule guards
against this by requiring from debt collectors certain disclosures when a debt
is time-barred.
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In one case, a law firm collecting on a gym membership debt that was timebarred for over four years did not disclose the debt was stale as Local Law 15 then
required. The elderly consumer made a payment with Social Security funds,
unknowingly restarting the clock. She was sued one year later.
The law’s other provisions are also important. By requiring debt collectors
to confirm a payment schedule or settlement agreement in writing, Local Law 15
and rules prevent debt collectors from making oral agreements with consumers,
and then reneging or changing the terms to unfair ones. Requiring debt collectors
to maintain records for the debts they collect, including of payments received,
settlement agreements, debt purchases, and monthly call logs, helps ensure that
consumers are not pursued for illegitimate debts. By requiring debt collectors to
provide a call-back number answered by a natural person, NYC’s laws address the
frustration faced by unsophisticated consumers who must navigate Kafkaesque
telephone systems with numerous prompts that discourage dispute resolution.
Exempting from the law attorneys engaged in the same practices as debt
collection agencies undermines the City’s attempt to level the playing field for
consumers and protect them from abusive collection tactics.
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B. Without Local Law 15 and DCA as an Enforcer and Mediator, Abused
Consumers are Left to Pursue Redress Through Disciplinary Action or
Through the Courts

New York State does not license debt collectors and its Debt Collection
Procedures statute does not provide for a private right of action or monetary
compensation. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 601, et seq. The only current recourse
for an individual NYC consumer abused by a debt collection attorney is to lodge a
complaint with the appropriate disciplinary committee, or to file an affirmative
case.
C. The State’s Disciplinary Rules Do Not Cover Activities Prohibited or
Required By Local Law 15

The court reasoned that lawyers are governed by the rules of professional
conduct, even when engaging in nonlegal services. 895 F. Supp. 2d at 470
“Charitably put, defendants’ cramped view of the scope of the judiciary’s authority
over attorney conduct is inaccurate.” Id. This misapprehension of what debt
collection attorneys do is directly at odds with congressional findings regarding
debt collection attorneys’ conduct and lack of debt collection attorney oversight by
states. New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“disciplinary rules”) provide
only a “minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action.” Preamble § 6. The great majority of these rules
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govern an attorney’s conduct in representation of clients. See, e.g., Departmental
Disciplinary Committee of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, First Judicial Department, 2011 Annual Report 27; First
Department Departmental Disciplinary Committee, Department of Disciplinary
Committee, Supreme Court, Complaint Against Lawyers Brochure (referring to
problems with “your lawyer” in the Introduction) (“First Department Brochure”) .
Those provisions that address a lawyer’s conduct toward those other than their
clients would not prevent the abusive and deceptive actions by debt collection
agencies Local Law 15 was designed to address.
Additionally, the disciplinary procedure is not an adequate remedy for
consumers harmed by such practices. Its purpose is to ensure that members of the
bar adhere to the standards set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct, not to
oversee their non-legal practices. See In re Popper, 193 A.D. 505, 510, 184 N.Y.S.
406, 409 (1920) (“The purpose [of disciplinary proceedings] to exercise the great
and summary power of the court, not for the benefit of a complaining individual,
but for the good of the community, and to uphold the administration of justice.”
(quotation omitted)).
Attorneys found to have violated the rules can be sanctioned or lose their
licenses to practice law. However, a disciplinary violation creates no civil liability
and provides no monetary compensation. In contrast, the DCA can impose a civil
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penalty for debt collection agencies that violate the rules. N.Y.C. Admin Code §
20-494.
When debating whether to eliminate the attorney exemption for the FDCPA,
which Congress did in 1986, Representative Annunzio noted that “There are those
who claim that H.R. 237 is unnecessary because attorney violations are rare and
can be handled on a case-by-case basis by State and local bar associations.
Unfortunately, the record does not bear this out.” 131 Cong. Rec. 33584 (1985).
He went on to quote a finding by the NYC Bar Association that:

The staggering increase in recent years in installment and other credit sales
has had a profound effect on that segment of the bar involved in collection
work. The demand of volume threatens to destroy all vestiges of
professionalism. The problem is too extensive to be remedied on a
case-by-case basis.
Id.
During these debates, Congress cited an FTC survey finding that fewer than half of
attorney disciplinary agencies had taken actions against attorneys for engaging in
conduct that violated the FDCPA, and those that did issued only private
admonitions. Wayne K. Lewis, Regulations of Attorney Debt Collectors--The Role
of the FTC and the Bar, 35 Hasting L.J. 669, 696 (1984). In the FTC investigation
involving the attorney Salvatore Spinelli and Oxford Collection Agency,
consumers had complained about the firm’s practices to the FTC, the Better
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Business Bureau, and various state attorneys general, but not to any grievance
committee.8 Oxford Complaint at 6, ¶ 23.
D. Affirmative Litigation Should Not Be Aggrieved Consumers’ Only
Option
Apart from DCA’s complaint mediation program and enforcement authority,
consumers have little recourse when firms engage in abusive debt collection
activities. The alternative of filing lawsuits based on the FDCPA or state law
against debt collection law firms is unrealistic in many instances. First, not all
violations of NYC law are necessarily violations of the FDCPA. Second, most
consumers are unaware of their rights under the FDCPA or state law, of their
rights to seek legal redress through litigation, or that the FDCPA is a fee-shifting
statute which relieves litigants from paying counsel to vindicate their rights. Third,
unlike the DCA mediation process, which typically mediates complaints in 20
days, litigation can be protracted and a daunting process for the average consumer.
These factors, along with the limited relief available under the FDCPA ($1000
maximum statutory damages) and GBL § 349 (actual damages or $50, with the
possibility of trebling up to $1,000), and the time and stress involved in litigation,
lead many consumers to decide that even though a debt collection law firm may

8

The law firm was located outside of NYC, and thus no complaints were lodged with DCA.
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have violated their rights, the time and stress involved in a lawsuit outweigh the
potentially for a small victory.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the Memorandum & Order of
the court invalidating Local Law 15.
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